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I. INTRODUCTION
The People's Republic of China recently has embarked on an
ambitious effort to modernize in the areas of agriculture, industry,
defense and technology in a plan known as the Four Moderniza-
tions Program. As part of this effort, the Chinese concurrently
are seeking to attract foreign investment and technology, for they
are now aware that if the modernization goals are to be met, it
will be necessary to participate in international commerce to a
greater extent than in the past. The attempt to attract foreign in-
vestment should be seen as part of a general move toward eco-
nomic realism and pragmatism which is currently taking place, a
move away from the radicalism of the Gang of Four and their
predecessors.
The Chinese government has begun to allow a limited amount of
private enterprise in the domestic economy. Thousands of small
private businesses, operating under licenses, have begun to ap-
pear in recent months. In certain cities, one can now find hawkers,
door-to-door salesmen and small shopkeepers, unheard of since the
heated days of the Cultural Revolution. Farmers on the communes
are now allowed to operate small private plots of land on their
own time and may sell the products in the cities for personal gain.
A group of former capitalists in Shanghai has been authorized to
form a private construction company to build and repair apart-
ments and office buildings. This move to let limited private enter-
prise become a part of the Chinese economy is supported by two
present concerns: a need to cope with a growing urban unemploy-
ment problem and a desire to let private businesses provide ser-
vices which the state-run economy cannot handle as efficiently.'
While all of this shows that today's Chinese political leaders are
economic realists, it does not mean that they are abandoning their
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. The economy will remain a
socialist one, run for the most part by central economic planners.
Chinese leaders are simply doing what they perceive as objective-
ly correct for the present stage in the evolution of the socialist
society. They see the need for limited domestic private enterprise
and believe that foreign investment and technology can speed up
the modernization process. They know that to attract this foreign
investment a reasonable profit margin and other incentives will
have to be offered to Western firms.
' See Kramer, China Allowing Limited Return of Capitalism, Asian Wall St. J., Aug. 16,
1979, at 1, col. 6.
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Thus, the Chinese have taken great steps toward building a
good trade and investment relationship with developed countries.
Trade agreements have been signed with Japan, the United States
and the European Economic Community.2 A joint venture law was
enacted in July, 1979. 3 The massive task of drafting a commercial
code has begun and other laws, such as tax codes, foreign exchange
regulations and a patent law are expected in the coming months.4
These laws are being enacted primarily for the benefit of Western
firms, which feel they will need legal protection for any investments
made in China, since the Chinese are able to operate internally
without a written commercial code. Until these legal codes are in
place, the Chinese are willing to grant by means of contracts the
protection which the foreign investor would normally find in the
legal systems of other countries. As evidence of their realism, the
Chinese agree to write all contracts in English, knowing that in-
sistence on Chinese language contracts would be an insurmount-
able barrier for most Western firms.
While taking these steps to attract foreign investment, the
Chinese insist that in developing foreign trade and investment
they will adhere to three principles: continuing independence,
equality of treatment, and observation of international pacts. The
Chinese are particularly concerned with preventing violations of
Chinese independence and sovereignty. It also should be noted
that the Chinese are as ethnocentric as Europeans and Americans,
perhaps even more so. In many ways, the Chinese still see them-
selves as Zhongguo, the "middle Kingdom," with a culture and
history which predates that of any Western nation. This should
not be overlooked by one seeking to do business in China.
Historically, the Chinese have had bitter experiences in dealing
with the West. In the nineteenth century, the Opium War with
the resulting Unequal Treaties, trade concessions and extraterri-
toriality in effect amounted to an attempted colonization of China.
Much of the past isolation and xenophobia of the Chinese was in re-
sponse to these bad experiences with Western business practices.
' See, eg, Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and
the People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1046
(1979).
1 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON
JOINT VENTURES USING CHINESE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (adopted by the Second Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress, July 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as LAW ON JOINT
VENTURES].
' The PRC Affairs Division, Bureau of East-West Trade, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, notes
that while this legislation is expected soon, as of April, 1980, none has been enacted. Inter-
view with Commerce Dep't officials (April 24, 1980).
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Thus, while the Chinese currently are very much interested in
increased trade and investment from the West, they are con-
cerned that they do not let the West, through trade again im-
pinge upon Chinese sovereignty. Successfully dealing with the
Chinese requires sensitivity to their past. The capitalist ideal that
free trade and competition unfettered by government control will
ultimately solve society's problems was foreign to traditional
Chinese thought and is contrary to modern thinking as well. Con-
sequently, one who does business in China must be willing to do so
on Chinese terms, which means dealing directly with the Chinese
government and fitting one's operations into the overall economic
modernization program.
For example, negotiations for investment opportunities are car-
ried out through the Chinese Foreign Trade Corporations, which
are government organizations under the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and which are responsible for all imports and exports, and
with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
When dealing with these organizations, it is important to remem-
ber that they are not as concerned with the maximization of im-
mediate profit as with the long-term growth and modernization of
the Chinese economy. Hence, it will be necessary to convince the
Chinese that one's plan for investment will not only generate
profits for the foreign partner, but also will be beneficial to the
Chinese in generating foreign exchange or acquiring modern tech-
nology.
This does not mean, of course, that the foreign investor should
hide his desire for profit. As economic realists, the present Chi-
nese leaders are fully aware of the fact that the profit incentive
is the motivating force behind Western companies. What it does
mean is that successful investment will allow the development of
these mutually beneficial investment relations on a long-term
basis. China's success or failure in the present effort will turn on
its ability to attract foreign investors and on the ability of both the
Chinese and foreign partners to adapt to the needs and goals of
the other. For the investor willing to make such a commitment,
China offers an exciting new area of investment opportunity.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT
A. Compensation Trade
What is termed "compensation trade" has emerged as one of
the most promising means of investment in the People's Republic
of China. T.he compensation trade formula is applied to both proc-
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essing and assembly operations. The basic arrangement involves
an agreement whereby foreign firms import capital equipment
into China, which is paid for in installments with low-cost goods
produced on the equipment. While some problems have been en-
countered, most of the firms involved in compensation trade have
been satisfied with the arrangements and many have reported
higher than expected profit returns.5 The Chinese government is
likely to continue to favor compensation trade agreements for
several years. As Cohen and Nee point out, the arrangements are
"an end-run around the problem of how to acquire the foreign ex-
change necessary to finance essential imports. The standard com-
pensation trade contract enables China to pay for capital imports
with future deliveries of goods; there is never any outflow of for-
eign exchange."' This is of particular importance, since it is Chi-
nese policy to avoid foreign debt as much as possible.
1. Forms of Compensation Trade
While most Western businessmen refer to both processing and
assembly operations as compensation trade, the Chinese prefer to
distinguish assembly, processing and "pure" compensation trade.
Processing operations involve the importation of raw materials
and packaging into China, which are processed by the Chinese ac-
cording to specifications. The Chinese charge a processing fee
which is purposely kept low compared to other Asian areas, such
as Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, since the Chi-
nese intend to remain competitive with other labor markets in
order to attract foreign exchange. Arrangements also are made
whereby the Chinese supply the raw materials and produce goods
based on specifications or samples provided by foreign business-
men. Again, a processing fee is charged, which usually includes
the costs of the materials supplied by the Chinese.! If any equip-
ment is supplied by the foreign partners, it is paid for by subtract-
ing its cost from the processing fees. The Chinese also have on
occasion agreed both to place private brand names or labels on the
processed goods and to honor trademarks.
' See Cohen & Nee, China. All About Compensation Trade, Part II, Asian Wall St. J.,
July 5, 1979, at 4, col. 6.
' See Cohen & Nee, Chin" All About Compensation Trade, Part I, Asian Wall St. J.,
July 4, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
If the cost of the materials is not to be included in the processing fee, then a separate
payment must be made.
19801 NOTE
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
Assembly operations work in much the same way. A foreign
businessman supplies component parts to be assembled in China
for an assembly fee. There are also cooperative production agree-
ments in which both the Chinese and foreign partner supply part
of the components to be assembled. In these operations, the for-
eign partner is granted an exclusive right to the output of the
cooperative production and pays an assembly fee plus part of the
profits from the sale of the product as payment for the parts sup-
plied by the Chinese. As in processing agreements, the fees
charged by the Chinese are very competitive; any equipment sup-
plied by the foreign party will be paid for by deducting its cost
from the-processing fees owed to the Chinese.
Pure compensation trade involves the importation of capital
equipment which is paid for in installments by commodities pro-
duced with the equipment. A type of indirect product compensa-
tion formula is used occasionally, in which case the payments are
made in the form of goods or commodities not produced on the
capital equipment itself, or in the form of raw materials. The Chinese
technically consider compensation trade as an installment loan,
with payment in goods instead of currency; thus, interest should
be considered in the calculation of the amount of product the for-
eign partner is to receive as payment for the equipment. The total
amount of the loan is the assigned value of the equipment (usually
negotiated on the basis of the original supplier's invoice) plus the
interest, with three years as the usual repayment period. The
price the foreign buyer pays per product unit is also negotiated in
the contract and only a portion of the product price can be set off,
so that the Chinese can earn foreign exchange at the same time
that the foreign partner gets lower cost goods.
It should be noted that the Chinese usually insist on a clause in
the contract which states that they are free to repay the loan (in
product) prior to its maturity. This conceivably could cause a
problem in two ways. First, some of the anticipated interest pay-
ments would be lost. Second, and more important, one could
perhaps find oneself with a glut of the product.8 This point should
be negotiated, especially in arranging an indirect compensation
agreement, where this could create an especially serious prob
lem.
' The author is not aware of any such problems being reported as yet. It seems unlikely
that production on newly acquired capital equipment could move so far ahead of schedule as
to present too great of a problem.
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2. Examples of Compensation Trade Agreements
An example of successful compensation trade is found in an
agreement between Mego International, Inc., a New York toy
manufacturer, and the factory of a Chinese commune in Pingzhou,
near Canton. Under this agreement, the Chinese produce Super-
man doll costumes for Mego.9 Mego has provided the Pingzhou
commune with industrial sewing machines valued at approxi-
mately $40,000 and has sent employees from its Hong Kong sub-
sidiary to train the Chinese factory workers in the use of the
machines, making of doll costumes and routine maintenance. Mego
sends pre-cut fabric to Pingzhou from Hong Kong and pays a fee
for each costume produced- two cents for each Superman cos-
tume, eight cents for more elaborate lacy doll costumes. While the
factory is Chinese managed, Mego officials say that the quality of
the costumes has been very good and feel that productivity will be
as good as or better than that of Hong Kong products in time. The
Pingzhou workers were slow at first, but productivity is increas-
ing with experience, so that one hundred-thirty workers are pro-
ducing three hundred thousand costumes per month at the mo-
ment.
Oxford Industries, Inc. is also involved in compensation trade.
Oxford supplies German-made pressing equipment needed by a
Chinese factory, installs it and trains workers in its use. Oxford is
compensated for its capital investment by a reduced price for the
goods produced in the factory, in this case, men's suits. Oxford
officials have also stated that they are very pleased with the qual-
ity of the Chinese product."i
Compensation trade agreements such as these are becoming
more common. The Chinese Xinhua News Agency reports that as
of June 1979, over three hundred contracts have been signed with
Hong Kong and Macao businessmen for the manufacture of prod-
ucts in Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province in southern China. Most
of these contracts involve processing and assembly work, believed
to be primarily in the field of light industrial products such as
electronic components. 1 Because wages in Chinese factories are
very low by Western standards (about one dollar for an eight-hour
day), the businesses involved here expect high profit margins.
' See Kramer, East Meets West, Wall St. J., July 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Kramer].
"D Interview with John Hunter of Oxford Industries, Inc. (July 16, 1979).
" Ching, Hong Kong and Macao Interests Gearing Up Production in China, Asian Wall
St. J., June 26, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
1980]
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
These profits should be realized when Chinese workers gain ex-
perience and productivity reaches planned levels.
3. Major Contract Issues in Compensation Trade Agreements
a. Initial Steps
In order to set up a compensation trade agreement, one must
first contact both the Foreign Trade Corporation (FTC) which is
responsible for the product to be manufactured and the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade. Various types of
Chinese officials, including Local, Provincial, District and Munici-
pal officials, have been given authority to negotiate agreements,
but the agreements also must be signed by the FTC concerned.
Approval of the provincial branch of the FTC is needed for
assembly and processing agreements in particular. If equipment
or assembly lines are to be imported, then the approval of the
State Planning Commission, the Foreign Trade Ministry and the
Peking office of the FTC are all required.
In negotiating such an agreement, one must keep in mind that
generally the law governing the operation will be the contract
itself. The Chinese are strict constructionists in their approach to
contracts, so it is important to state the terms of the agreement as
simply and clearly as possible in the contract. Contract terms
dealing with protection of industrial property rights and dispute
settlement procedures will be dealt with in detail in Sections III
and IV, infra.
b. Inspection Requirements
While the Chinese will allow the foreign partner's technical
staff to inspect the goods before accepting delivery, the inspection
must take place within China. Inspections usually will be followed
with inspections by the Chinese Commodities Inspection Bureau
(CIB), which has the responsibility for inspection of all goods going
into or out of China. The CIB has gained a reputation for meticulous-
ness and objectivity in its inspection procedures, with respect to
both Chinese-made and foreign-made goods. 3 Once the goods leave
China, one will not be able to return them or to make a claim based on
2 See note 5 supra.
'3 See Lubman, Contracts, Practice and Law in Trade with China: Some Observations, in
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., CHINESE ECONOMY POST-MAo, A COMPENDIUM
OF PAPERS 777 (Joint Comm. Print 1978), for a discussion of PRC inspection procedures.
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non-conformity.'4 Thus, one must decide whether to trust the CIB
inspection; if not, then one will face the expense of sending techni-
cal staff to China for inspections.
Cohen and Nee suggest specifying in the contract a permissible
percentage of non-conforming goods in order to avoid disputes
over the issue. They also point out that the Chinese will agree in
their contracts to destroy any non-conforming goods, unless one
allows them to sell them within China or by export to other
buyers without a trademark or tradename. The Chinese also are
very concerned about promoting their own exports to earn the
foreign exchange necessary for importing whole plants and
modern technology. This in itself provides a great incentive for
the CIB to ensure that non-conforming goods are not allowed to
pass inspection, since a reputation for low quality products would
undermine their program.
c. Delivery of Goods
Delivery delays have been reported as another possible prob-
lem. Delays which have occurred usually have two causes; low
productivity due to worker absenteeism, and transportation bot-
tlenecks. Absenteeism, it is reported, presents a problem in some
factories because the wages are so low. Workers see no reason to
work for the capitalists if they must work harder than at their
usual jobs for the same pay. 5 This has been somewhat of a prob-
lem at the Pingzhou commune factory, mentioned earlier, but the
government has been trying to solve the problem by offering
bonuses and better benefits to the most productive workers in
those factories which meet their contract requirements. Delays
also have occurred due to the lack of a well developed transporta-
tion system. The Pingzhou commune is only ninety miles from
Hong Kong, but one shipping delay of fourteen days was reported."6
To deal with the problem, Chinese officials have told the
Transportation Ministry that it may be required to pay any claims
for late delivery due to shipping delays.'7
These problems should not cause great concern. Mego Interna-
tional, Oxford Industries and others involved in compensation
trade have been pleased with their arrangements in spite of these
problems. Many Hong Kong businessmen have reported high
* See note 5 supra.
* See note 9 supra.
I Id
'~See note 5 supra.
1980] NOTE
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
profits. It is advisable, however, to include in the contract a clause
which covers delayed deliveries, in order to establish grounds for
a claim if necessary. The contract clause would be the primary
evidence used in settling the claim.
d. Transfer of Title on Capital Goods
Another area of potential legal concern which should be dealt
with in the contract concerns the time at which title to equipment
is transferred. In pure compensation trade, the equipment is paid
for by the product produced on the equipment. Thus, it is impor-
tant to determine who shall be responsible for the maintenance,
service, and provision of spare parts for the equipment until it is
fully paid for. The parties also should state in the contract who is
the owner of the equipment and who should bear the loss in the
event of damage to or destruction of the equipment by natural
forces (such as fire and flood) before the transaction is completed
and the equipment is paid for in full. Further, it should be speci-
fied in the contract who is responsible for the maintenance of
equipment set up in China. 8
Compensation trade should be a good approach to investment in
China for small and medium-sized firms, since the amount of capi-
tal investment required can be small (as with Mego International),
while the profit margin on the sale of the low-cost goods obtained
can be quite high. As long as there is a stable market demand, the
Chinese probably will consider the compensation trade approach
for almost any manufactured item which they feel will sell well
enough to generate foreign exchange."
B. Joint Ventures
The Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic
of China enacted a law on joint ventures, effective July 8, 1979,
which for the first time provided a legal framework for equity
joint ventures with the Chinese. The fifteen article law, while not
as specific as some Western businessmen had hoped it would be,
offers guidelines under which management procedures as well as
procedures for the employment and discharge of staff and
workers can be negotiated and stipulated in detail in the joint ven-
ture contract or articles of association. It also gives legal protec-
18 See Tsai, Some Questions About Compensation Trade, 16 CHINA TRADE REPORT 5
(1978).
19 See note 6 supra.
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tion for a foreign partner's assets and profits and provides general
principles for the organization and operation of joint ventures.
1. General Guidelines
a. Equality and Mutual Benefit Requirements
The guiding principle which will control all joint ventures is
that of "equality and mutual benefit."2 Indeed, this is to be the
principle upon which all investment and trade with China is to be
based. One should become accustomed to the phrase, for it is used
often in the joint venture law, the recently signed United States-
China Trade agreement and in many contracts. It is a principle which
the Chinese take quite seriously, especially in light of historic pre-
revolutionary attempts by Western concerns to subjugate China
to a quasi-colonial economic status. The principle does not grant
protection solely to the Chinese, however. It also protects the for-
eign investor, who operates in a foreign country which has a cen-
trally planned economy and who must deal not with private indi-
viduals but with government organizations which are authorized
to do business by the central planners.
b. Authorization
All joint venture contracts and articles of association must be
authorized by the Foreign Investment Commission of the People's
Republic of China. If approved, the joint venture must then be
registered with the General Administration for Industry and
Commerce before it can begin operation under license. Approval
or rejection will be given within three months of application.2' The
Foreign Investment Commission should become an important
body which is influential in determining the form of day to day
operations of joint ventures. The patterns established by the
Foreign Investment Commission for the approval or disapproval
of contracts will be particularly significant indicators of the cli-
mate for investment, since contracts will control the procedures of
management decision making as well as employment policies.
c. Board of Directors
Businessmen have expressed disappointment over the vague-
ness of the new law regarding management and employment/dis-
LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 1.
2, LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 3.
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charge procedures. As a result, many -investors state that they
will wait for more specific legislation before investing, due to con-
cern over the protection of the foreign interest.22 For example,
under article 6, joint ventures are to have a board of directors
with a chairman appointed by the Chinese side and one or two
vice-chairmen appointed by the foreign partner. The actual com-
position of the board remains to be stipulated in the contracts be-
tween the parties and in the articles of association. The law states
that each director will be appointed or removed by his own side.
Although the power of the board under article 6 is rather broad,
encompassing the power to act on "all fundamental issues concern-
ing the venture"23 subject to the provisions of the articles of
association, the law states only that "the board of directors shall
reach decision through consultation by the participants on the
principle of equality and mutual benefit." This lack of specificity
concerning the actual decision making process which the board
will follow and the lack of detail concerning its actual composition
give rise to hesitancy on the part of some potential investors. The
vagueness of the law on these points, however, need not cause
concern. Indeed, attorneys experienced in dealing with the Chinese
point out that the absence of detail may, in fact, be advantageous
in that it preserves a certain amount of flexibility in negotiat-




Should disputes arise, they are to be settled under article 14
through consultation by the board of directors. There appear to be
few serious problems here. Since this affects both parties, they
will consult each other readily to settle any problems which may
arise. However, if there is a dispute which cannot be settled by
consultation, article 14 provides for "consultation or arbitration
by an arbitral body of China or through an arbitral body agreed
upon by the parties."
22 China Joint Ventures Law is Expected to be Vague, Asian Wall St. J., June 28, 1979,
at 1, col. 3.
" The areas of power specifically enumerated are "expansion projects, production and
business programs, the budget, distribution of profits, plans concerning manpower and pay
scales, the termination of business, the appointment or hiring of the president, vice-presi-
dents), the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors as well as their functions and
powers and their remunerations, etc." LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 6.
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Section 4 provides a more thorough treatment of Chinese dis-
pute settlement procedures. Note that, while recently more and
more third party arbitration clauses have been appearing in Chi-
nese import and export contracts, no actual arbitration in third
countries has been reported (except for maritime arbitration). Of
the approximately 100 cases in which the Chinese Foreign Trade
Commission (FTAC) has been consulted,' only a very few have
gone as far as a final arbitral award.24
A strong cultural incentive remains to settle disputes by
"friendly negotiations," "consultation," or "conciliation." The Chi-
nese can be expected to be reluctant to agree to third country ar-
bitration, unless a high priority technology is involved. The major
complaint about these settlement methods has been the expense
in both money and time of sending staff to Peking for negotia-
tions. This should not be as much of a problem with joint ventures
since foreign staff already would be stationed in China. In any
event, dispute settlement procedures should be established clear-
ly in the contract.
b. Breach of Contract
Article 13 of the new law offers protection to the foreign part-
ner against any attempts by the Chinese side to breach their
agreements. If any party breaches the contract, then that party
must bear the financial responsibility for any losses caused by the
breach. What the clause means is that if the Chinese side were to
breach, then the injured party would have a sound legal basis for
a claim for damages. Note, however, that this clause could also be
used against a foreign investor should his side breach.
c. Premature Termination of the Contract
Article 13 allows the premature termination of the joint ven-
ture contract "in cases of heavy losses, the failure of any party to
a joint venture to execute its obligations under the contract or the
article of association of the venture, force majeure, etc." Termina-
tion would require the consultation and agreement of both parties,
authorization by the Foreign Investment Commission and regis-
tration with the General Administration for Industry and Com-
" A delegation of the American Arbitration Association which visited Beijing(Peking) in
1975 was told that in all of 1974 only one dispute has been settled by arbitration, twelve by
consultations and over one hundred by friendly negotiations. Torbert, The American
Lawyers' Role in Trade with China, 63 A.B.A.J. 1117 (1977).
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merce. This probably means that should the joint venture turn out
to be highly unprofitable there would be a legal avenue open for
dissolving the venture, one which would preclude any later claims
of breach for premature termination. This clause also protects the
foreign partner from premature termination by the Chinese, since
unilateral termination would constitute a breach giving the for-
eign partner a legal claim for any losses sustained. Article 13 also
provides protection against nationalization, since termination
without consent would be a breach for which the Chinese side
would be required by law to bear the financial responsibility for
any loss.
3. Protection of Investments and Profits
Protection of the foreign investment is also found in article 2,
which states that "the Chinese government protects, by the legis-
lation in force, the resources invested by a foreign participant in a
joint-venture and the profits due him ... as well as his other law-
ful rights and interests." This clause obviously is intended to
assure potential foreign partners that their investments will be
safeguarded. The Chinese are well aware that if their drive to in-
duce foreign investment is to be successful, they must quell any
concerns about nationalization, sequestration, or freezing of
assets. Consider the following excerpt from a speech delivered by
Zhang Jinfu, Chinese Minister of Finance:
Our friends can rest assured about the protection of the rights
and interests of foreign partners in economic cooperation. We
Chinese always mean what we say and live up to our words. In
future as always, we will keep good faith with regard to both
foreign investments and bank or government loans. So far as
joint ventures are concerned, we have enacted law safeguarding
foreign investment in China and its legitimate interests.25
Perhaps the greatest protection for the foreign partner is the
knowledge, on the part of the Chinese, that without protection it
will be difficult, if not impossible, to attract the foreign invest-
ment and technology needed for the Four Modernizations Pro-
gram. Even without legal protection, the knowledge that infringe-
ments would deter other parties from investing in China provides
" Speech made by His Excellency Zhang Jinfu, Minister of Finance of the People's
Republic of China, at the luncheon given by David Rockefeller (July 13, 1979) (text provided
by the Commercial Office, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C.).
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strong motivation for fairness in dealing with foreign partners.
Although only time will tell, there now seems little reason for real
concern unless there is a political transformation with the return
of more radical elements to power.
4. Permissible Forms of Business Organizations
a. Limited Liability Company
Joint ventures are to take the form of a limited liability com-
pany, with the profits, risks and losses of the venture to be shared
in proportion to each party's contribution to the registered capi-
tal. While generally the foreign partner's share will be a minimum
of 250/0, the law sets no maximum percentage of foreign participa-
tion."0 The percentage of foreign participation will be negotiated
on a case-by-case basis according to economic circumstances. It is
unlikely that a maximum limit will be imposed at a later stage. As
Vice-Premier Li Xiannian has stated: "China does not confine
itself to the established international practice of 51% (for the local
partner) and 49/o. The proportion of investment from foreign com-
panies can be higher than 50/o."Z
b. Limitations of Majority Control
Majority control of assets does not assure foreign control of the
venture. Control may be somewhat undermined by the necessity
of having management procedures in the contract and the articles
of association approved by the Foreign Investment Commission
and the presence of a Chinese board chairman. The Chinese have
repeatedly stated that there will be no extraterritorality in China
and article 2 makes it clear that "all the activities of a joint ven-
ture shall be governed by the laws, decrees, and pertinent rules
and regulations of the People's Republic of China." There is also a
clause in article 9 which states that "the production and business
programs of a joint venture shall be filed with the authorities con-
cerned." While this does not say that joint venture projects will
actually have to be approved by Chinese government organiza-
tions, it does seem to indicate that joint ventures will be expected
to cooperate with government organizations in working within the
26 LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 4.
22 Washington Post, July 18, 1979, at B5, col. 6.
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centrally planned economy. As Cohen and Nee put it, "only time
will tell how much autonomy the venture will enjoy."28
5. Capital Contributions
Under article 5, each party's investment contribution may be in
the form of cash, capital goods, industrial property rights, etc.
Also, the Chinese partner may contribute the right to the use of a
site. The specific contribution to be made by each side is to be
stipulated in the contract and articles of association of the ven-
ture, with the value of each contribution (except for the Chinese
site) to be ascertained by the parties through joint assessment.
The Chinese will determine unilaterally the value of the site.
Negotiations on the value of particular contributions are sure to
be detailed and arduous, especially in relation to technological con-
tributions which are difficult to value. The Chinese can be ex-
pected to be reasonable, however, since one of the primary goals
of organizing joint ventures is the acquisition of the foreign tech-
nology. Just as in the West, as long as the foreign investor has
something the other side wants, a good deal can be negotiated.
Article 5 states that:
The technology or equipment contributed by any foreign partici-
pant as investment shall be truly advanced and appropriate to
China's needs. In cases of losses caused by deception through
the intentional provision of outdated equipment or technology,
compensation shall be paid for the losses.
This implies that foreign investors should not attempt to import
old equipment or technology, as has often been done in developing
countries, since substantial penalties may be imposed. If a foreign
partner wishes to provide older equipment or technology out of a
sincere belief that it is more appropriate for China's present needs
than more advanced technology, he should be sure to negotiate
the point clearly and specify in the contracts just what quality of
equipment and technology is to be provided. As long as the nature
of the capital is kept above board and appropriate reasons are
given for the use of less advanced technology, it is doubtful that
there will be disputes later, provided the Chinese agree with the
assessment. 9
" Cohen & Nee, Joint Ventures: Behind the Headlines Part II, Asian Wall St. J., July
24, 1979, at 4, col. 3.
' With languages as different as Chinese and English, communication is a potentially
serious problem. Mr. John Hunter, of Oxford Industries, says that the few minor disputes
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In negotiating a proposal for a joint venture it should be re-
membered that the Chinese seek long-term partnerships. The law
places no limit on the length of joint ventures, stating merely that
"the contract period of a joint venture may be agreed upon be-
tween the parties to the venture according to its particular line of
business and circumstances."3 Chinese officials report that "the
duration may be ten years, twenty years, or even longer."31 If this
is the case, it may not be advisable to offer old equipment and
technology as the foreign investor's share of the capital since its
future replacement might prove difficult.
It has been pointed out that one of the main incentives for the
Chinese to form joint ventures is that they gain access to Western
international marketing expertise.32 This view is reflected in arti-
cle 9, section 3, which states that "a joint venture is encouraged to
market its products outside China," either directly, through
authorized affiliated agencies outside China, or through China's
foreign trade establishments. If one does not wish to become in-
volved to such a degree in the long term international marketing
of the product and is looking instead for a shorter term invest-
ment, then compensation trade arrangements would be more suit-
able.
As enterprises are encouraged to export, joint ventures will be
primarily resource seeking, as opposed to market seeking, invest-
ments (although products may also be distributed on the Chinese
market). In recognition of this, article 9 attaches first priority to
Chinese sources in the acquisition of required raw and semi-proc-
essed materials, fuels, auxiliary equipment, etc. If unavailable in
China, materials can be purchased on the international market,
but the ventures' own foreign exchange funds must be used.
6. Profit Distribution, Repatriation, and Taxation
a. Determination of Income Tax and Net Profit
The net profit of a joint venture is to be distributed proportion-
ately according to each party's share in the registered capital of
the venture
which have arisen in Oxford's compensation trade arrangement have all been communica-
tion problems. In his opinion, if the Chinese once reach an agreement and understand what
is being agreed upon, then the bargain is good. Interview (July 16, 1979).
30 LAw ON JOINT VENTURES art. 12.
Li Xiannian, reported in Washington Post, July 18, 1979, at B5, col. 6.
Interview with Kiichi Mochizuki, Vice-President and General Manager of Nippon Steel,
U.S.A., Inc. (July 11, 1979). Mr. Mochizuki was referring particularly to the steel industry,
but it seems reasonable to assume this would be true in other industries as well.
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[a]fter the payment of a joint venture income tax on its gross
profit pursuant to the tax laws of the People's Republic of China
and after the deductions therefrom as stipulated in the articles
of association of the venture for the reserve funds, the bonus
and welfare funds for the workers and staff members, and the
expansion funds of the venture."
Both the unofficial English translation and the Chinese text of the
law are unclear on the formula for determining net profits; i.e.,
whether the above mentioned deductions from gross profits are to
come before or after the imposition of the income tax.
To illustrate, there are two possible formulas: (GP - Tax/o) -
Deduction = NP, or (GP - Deduction) - Tax/o = NP. This is a
question of considerable significance, as can be seen from the fol-
lowing example. Suppose a venture grosses $100,000 in profit,
with a 10% joint venture income tax and a total of $20,000 in
deductions for reserve funds, bonus and welfare funds, and expan-
sion funds. If the income tax is levied before the deductions, the
net profit would be ($100,000 - 10%) - $20,000, or a total of
$70,000. On the other hand, if the tax is levied after the deductions
are taken, then net profit would be ($100,000 - $20,000) - 10%,
or a total of $72,000.
The difference in net profits could add up quickly over the
years. Legal experts believe that the latter method (deductions
before tax) will be used and see this as an incentive for foreign in-
vestors, since expansion funds normally come from after-tax re-
tained earnings in the West. It remains to be seen, however, how
the guidelines of article 7 will be interpreted and applied. The for-
mula to be used and the tax rate itself will not be known until the
enactment of a comprehensive tax law." Until such legislation is in
place, the tax rate and formula should be negotiated and included
in the contract and articles of association.
b. Incentives for Modern Technology Project and Profit Re-
investment
Clearer incentives are offered for foreign partners who supply
modern technology or reinvest net profits in China. Under article
7, a joint venture with up-to-date technology (by world standards)
3 LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 7.
u Cohen & Nee, Joint Ventures Behind the Headlines, Part II, Asian Wall St. J., July
24, 1979, at 4, col. 3.
" Although expected soon, tax codes governing foreign investors have not been enacted
as of April, 1980. See note 4 supra.
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will be allowed to apply for a reduction in or exemption from the
joint venture income tax for the first two to three profitable
years. Similarly, a foreign partner who reinvests any part of his
share of net profit may apply for restitution of a part of the in-
come taxes paid. Details with regard to application procedures,
criteria for acceptance and rejection, and the rates of reduction or
restitution are still in the formative stage. It also remains to be
seen whether or not the domestic industrial and commercial con-
solidated tax will be applied to joint ventures. No mention of this
tax is made in the new law, so this would lead one to assume that
it will not be applicable. These questions should be answered
when a tax code is enacted. Given China's drive to attract foreign
partners and technology, tax rates probably will be kept low to
avoid discouraging potential investors. 6
c. Repatriation Rights
The foreign partner will be allowed to have net profits, funds
obtained upon the liquidation of the venture, and other funds as
well, remitted abroad through the Bank of China (BOC) in accord-
ance with foreign exchange regulations (yet to be enacted) and in
the currency or currencies specified in the contract of the joint
venture. "Encouragements" will be provided to a foreign partici-
pant who deposits in the Bank of China any part of the foreign ex-
change he is entitled to remit abroad, although no mention is
made of what form these encouragements will take. 7 Earlier
drafts have stated that if remitable foreign exchange is deposited
in the BOC, the accrued interest could be deducted in part from
the income tax which has been paid. It also has been stated that
the interest earned on personal income deposited in the BOC
would be free of any income tax. 8 Similar encouragements may
emerge in the near future. Personal income in the form of wages,
salaries, or other legitimate income earned by a foreign worker or
staff member of a joint venture may also be remitted abroad
' Randall Edwards, Professor of law at Columbia University, notes that the Chinese now
want to attract foreign investment and know that certain incentives and guarantees must
be offered in order to do so. It is his opinion that the Chinese will avoid tax measures which
are clearly disincentives such as the consolidated tax. He also points out that ten American
tax specialists have been attending an international tax seminar being held in Beijing for
the Chinese. Thus, it seems clear that the Chinese should be aware of which tax policies are
considered incentives and which disincentives. Interview (August 9, 1979).
3 LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 10.
Liu, Toning Down the Spirit, 105 FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW 84 (July 27, 1979).
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through the Bank of China after the payment of a personal income
tax. This latter tax has not been enacted. 8
d. Methods of Financial Transactions
Most financial transactions will involve the Bank of China. Joint
ventures are required by article 8 to open an account with the
BOC or with a bank which has been approved by the BOC. This
perhaps is to ensure that foreign exchange regulations are fol-
lowed and to enable the Chinese government to monitor financial
transactions in general. A joint venture will be allowed to obtain
funds from foreign banks for sole use in its business operations.
This indicates that the joint venture will be able to borrow some
funds directly from foreign banks without going through the BOC.
7. The Chinese View of Written Legal Documents
Luo Xin, with the Commercial Section of the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China in Washington, D.C., points out that
while the concept of written law is traditional for the United
States and most other Western nations, it is something quite new
for the Chinese. ° For example, nearly all aspects of American life
are in some way related to a specific written law. Even in such a
mundane affair as going to a nearby restaurant, one encounters
the law in the form of a sales tax. By contrast, in China the
average citizen never encounters law personally, except when get-
ting married or where a criminal offense is committed. It has not
been thought necessary to have a comprehensive set of laws to
guide people's daily conduct, because the people know through
their general cultural and social education what are proper and
improper modes of conduct. 1
'9 LAW ON JOINT VENTURES art. 11.
,0 Interview with Luo Xin, Second Secretary of the Embassy of the People's Republic of
China, in Washington, D.C. (July 27, 1979).
" The difference in conceptual frameworks here is subtle yet basic. The different
methods of addressing a letter is an illustration common to students of the Chinese
language. In Chinese, letters are addressed from general to specific, naming the country,
province, county, city, street number, and finally the person in that order. In English, by
contrast, the person is named first, then the number, the street, the city, the state, and
finally the country, going from specific to general. A parallel is found in the attitudes
regarding government officials. The Chinese attitude is reflected in both the traditional
attitude that if a government official were trained generally in the Confucian virtues, his
particular daily actions would be proper, and in the modern view that cadres should first
have proper political understanding before they can be correct in their analysis of par-
ticular economic problems. Contrast this to the Western attitude, where government
[Vol. 10:2
However, Mr. Luo notes that China realizes the need for develop-
ing a written commercial code if China is to deal with foreign coun-
tries in the Four Modernizations Program now under way. The
joint venture law is only a beginning in the development of writ-
ten commercial law and as such is meant to be a statement of
general principles. The Chinese have had no experience with joint
ventures. Thus, they presently do not kno'w just where problems
may lie.
The hope is that the new law will allow for the step-by-step
development of good business relationships with foreign coun-
tries. Quoting a Chinese saying, "It is always more difficult to
make a good beginning," Mr. Luo is of the opinion that, while
some foreign companies will hesitate and take a wait-and-see atti-
tude before investing in China, other companies will be willing to
take a step forward and work with the Chinese in mutually devel-
oping and learning from the experience of joint ventures. To re-
assure those who may be thinking of engaging in joint ventures
with the Chinese, Mr. Luo stresses that the Chinese will strictly
honor their contracts, and will abide by the agreements reached
between the parties concerning management and employment
procedures."2
When questioned specifically about management procedures re-
garding the means of protecting the foreign or minority interest,
Mr. Luo stated that there is no need for the foreign partner to
worry because the venture will be operated by both parties. He
stressed that the proper people will be selected from the foreign
side to fill management positions, that the Chairman of the Board
of Directors will not monopolize his position, and that the Chair-
man will not follow a policy of putting foreign personnel only in
minor posts.43 It will be important to maintain a "spirit of coopera-
bureaucrats are expected to follow detailed rules and procedural guidelines, which are sup-
posed to insure objectivity and good government regardless of underlying political beliefs.
"2 It should be noted that the Chinese have a good reputation for strictly honoring their
contracts. A statement commonly heard from businessmen with experience in trade with
China is that the Chinese FTC negotiators are very tough, but once they have agreed to in-
clude a particular item in a contract, willful noncompliance is rare.
43 A. Jackson Rich of the PRC Affairs Division of the U.S. Department of Commerce
notes that in a few contractual joint operations which have been going on in China near
Shanghai and Canton since April 1979, the foreign partner has been allowed authority to
hire and fire workers and to manage factories on a day-to-day basis. According to Mr. Rich,
no worker-management committees have been set up in these joint operations, and in their
day-to-day operation the factories are similar to capitalist joint ventures. These few joint
operations involve Hong Kong and Japanese foreign partners. Interview with A. Jackson
Rich at the Department of Commerce in Washington, D.C. (July 25, 1979).
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tion" in the daily affairs of the enterprise. In order to run a fac-
tory properly, both parties must rely on and have confidence in
each other. Mr. Luo believes that if both parties have this cooper-
ative spirit, both will do what is best for the enterprise as a whole,
since that is naturally what is best for both parties. While the reli-
ance on a cooperative spirit may seem to Western businessmen to
be a naive approach to international business, it is seen by the
Chinese as a prerequisite to developing long-term business rela-
tionships. The Chinese have little interest in potential partners
who do not show this willingness to cooperate in the development
of the enterprise.
8. Concluding Observations
One can see that although the new law on joint ventures is not
as detailed as those in other countries, it reflects careful thought.
The Chinese have taken a major step in reaching out to Japan and
the West for the acquisition of modern technology. Since the goal
of allowing joint ventures is to modernize the economy and raise
the people's standard of living, it follows that joint ventures
should provide a framework in which both the Chinese and foreign
partners can develop a mutually beneficial relationship. The key to
success will be the negotiating stage; if clear agreements are
reached concerning areas which are not covered in detail in the
law, then the law should prove to be adequate. Important areas
for negotiation include: management procedures; personnel em-
ployment and discharge practices; the type, age and quality of
technology and equipment to be offered; and issues of profit deter-
mination and taxation.
Those firms willing to undertake investment negotiations at
this initial stage would, of course, have an increased opportunity
to assist the Chinese in their economic development and to make
potentially high profits on what should be very competitively
priced products of Chinese joint ventures. Risks are involved, of
course, the largest being the possibility of subsequent political
changes giving rise to rule by groups which are opposed to for-
eign investment. This possibility appears remote if present efforts
to attract foreign investment prove successful and if that invest-
ment in turn is successful in modernizing China's economy.
[Vol. 10:2
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III. PROTECTION OF PATENTS AND
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
A. Current Legal Framework
1. Existing Regulations
When investing or importing into a developing country such as
China, one naturally is concerned about the protection of one's in-
dustrial property, such as patents, know-how and trademarks.
This concern is particularly important in view of the fact that one
of the primary goals of China's present economic drive is the ac-
quisition of modern technology. At present there exists no patent
law in the People's Republic of China to protect the supplier of
this technology. Two domestic regulations passed in October,
1963, termed "Regulations on Awards for Inventions and Regula-
tions on Awards for Technical Improvements," are of some value
to the importer. Under these regulations a party may apply to the
Chinese government for recognition of an invention or a techno-
logical improvement. If the state finds the invention or improve-
ment useful, it will award a registration certificate and possibly a
cash bonus. A foreigner may apply for these certificates, though
they are of questionable legal value."
The problem which these regulations pose for the foreign private
investor is that they make the Chinese state the owner of all new
inventions and technology. The state may sell that technology to
foreigners through the Ministry of Foreign Trade if the State
Scientific Commission approves. This must be seen in light of
China's socialist political and economic system. There is a basic
antagonism between the Western view, which encourages the
granting of patent rights to private individuals who may exploit
the patented technology for their own economic advantage, and
the Chinese viewpoint, in which new technology is to be com-
munally used by the masses for the benefit of the masses. In
short, the Chinese do not believe in the sanctity of private prop-
erty in the same way as the West; this is especially true regarding
intellectual property.
2. Protection and the Contract
In contrast to their ideological aversion to patents, however, is
found a willingness on the part of the Chinese to contractually
" UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 19 (1979).
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grant protection of industrial property rights to foreign importers
and investors. Thus, it becomes imperative that appropriate lan-
guage be included in the contract which will restrict the duplica-
tion, disclosure or unlicensed transfer of any patented technology
provided by a firm. 5 Until recently, most transfers of technology
were in the form of whole plant or turnkey projects. In such cases,
it would be necessary to negotiate with the China National Tech-
nical Import Corporation for the inclusion of such a contract
clause. Due to the growth of assembly and processing operations
in recent months, it is now necessary to negotiate with the other
Foreign Trade Corporations on the matter. A typical clause in a
turnkey contract reads as follows:
Within __ years after signing the - contract, the
buyers shall not disclose in whole or in part to any third party
the know-how, Technical Documentation and other information
of the process obtained under the Contract. The secrecy does
not apply to those parts of the know-how, Technical Documenta-
tion or other information of the process which become part of
the public knowledge or literature. The license, know-how, Tech-
nical Documentation and other information are to be used only
for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the Contract
Plant."
The Chinese are now working on a patent system which they hope
to have completed by the end of 1980, according to reports from
the International Patent Office of the United States Department of
Commerce. 8 The International Patent Office has been impressed
with the level of Chinese expertise in discussions on patent matters
which have taken place and predicts that once enacted the Chi-
nese patent system will be sophisticated. Until a patent system is
actually in place, however, the contract will continue to be the
source of any industrial property rights.
An important question for investors concerns the nature and
"5 See note 5 supra.
" Clark, China's Changing Views on Project Contracts-A Lawyer's Appraisal, in
WORLDWIDE PROJECTS 49 (February-March, 1979).
"6 Trainees have been sent to Japan, West Germany, Yugoslavia and other countries to
learn techniques of patent examination, and patent documents from various countries have
been gathered for study in Beijing. The most contact has been with Japan. There have been
several exchanges of delegations between the Chinese and the Japanese Patent Offices and,
in April of 1979, it was announced that an agreement on Sino-Japanese cooperation in
patent work had been reached whereby the Japanese would help train Chinese patent per-
sonnel. Tentative plans have been made to send Chinese patent trainees to the United
States in September 1980 to study patent. examination. Interview with officials of the Inter-
national Patent Office of the U.S. Dep't of Commerce in Washington, D.C. (June 26, 1979).
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scope of this contractual protection. The recently signed United
States-China Trade Agreement, when ratified, will offer assur-
ance by the Chinese that patent protection will be given which is
"equivalent" to that given by the United States." The Trade
Agreement also states that "both Contracting Parties shall permit
and facilitate enforcement of provisions concerning protection of
industrial property in contracts... and shall provide means ... to
restrict unfair competition involving unauthorized use of such
rights."49
One expert who accompanied a recent American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) delegation to China feels that purely contractual pro-
tection is sufficient for the moment, even though as an attorney
he would prefer to see a patent law in place. The Chinese stressed
to the ABA delegation that China will abide strictly by the patent
protection clauses in contracts and emphasized that contractual
protection was "as good as any patent law."5 The present need of
foreign technology also offers a certain degree of protection in
itself. The Chinese are aware that if disclosures or misappropria-
tion of technology or know-how takes place, then it will become
difficult to find other foreign companies which are willing to im-
port their technology and thus would be harmful to them in the
long run.
B. Policy on Post-Investment Technological Development
The Chinese recognize the Western concern for patent protec-
tion. Just as they see the need for a written joint venture law and
commercial code, they see the need for patent and know-how pro-
tection if they are to attract foreign investment and technology.
Thus, instead of arguing against the recognition of patents as
many developing countries do, China has begun developing a com-
prehensive patent system and gives assurances that industrial
property rights will be protected.
For the most part, the record bears out this interpretation of
the Chinese approach to the question. Most attorneys and busi-
, Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China [hereinafter cited as Trade Agreement], July 7, 1979, art. VI,
§ 3 states, "Both Contracting Parties agree... to ensure to legal or natural persons of the
Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to the patent and trademark protec-
tion correspondingly accorded by the other Party."
" Trade Agreement, id at art. VI, § 4.
'o Interview with Donald 0. Clark, senior partner with the Atlanta firm of Hurt, Richard-
son, Garner, Todd, and Cadenhead (June 29, 1979).
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nessmen involved in trade with China are unaware of any cases of
Chinese copying or re-exporting technology. Indeed, it is diffi-
cult to find any cases of misappropriation of technology reported
anywhere. It should be remembered, however, that if the Chinese
were to copy patented technology, it would be difficult if not im-
possible for a foreigner to find out about it as long as the copied
projects or plants are kept in areas which are still off-limits to
foreigners. Thus, if the Chinese really wish to copy, it may prove
difficult to stop them, with or without statutory or contractual
protection.
At the same time, it is usually not worthwhile for the Chinese
to copy foreign products, due to the lack of a modern technological
base in terms of material and skilled manpower. Of the two cases
of copying which are known, both were unsuccessful for this
reason. The first case involved a steel processing plant sold to the
Chinese by a West German firm in the late 1960's. The plant was
reportedly partially reproduced in another area of China, which, of
course, angered the Germans who had hoped to sell another plant.
The copy, however, was not successful. Thus, the Chinese con-
tinue to buy whole steel plants instead of building their own. The
second case is a recent one, involving Chinese attempts to make a
copy of urea fertilizer plants being built in China by an American
firm. Again, the copy did not work. The American firm chose not
to press a claim due to a desire not to disrupt work that was being
done on other plants.
C. Concluding Observations
At the moment, there would appear to be little need for concern
about protection of industrial property rights, due both to the Chi-
nese awareness of the long term difficulties misappropriations
would entail and the lack of the necessary technological base to
copy technology successfully. But what of the investor who is still
worried about potential problems of misappropriation and the
general conflict between developed and developing countries on
the question of technology transfer? What course should be taken?
Perhaps the answer is to be found in the model of certain
Japanese companies, since Japan has had the most experience and
success in trading with China. As an example, a senior official of
Nippon Steel, U.S.A. points out that his firm does not see the
transfer of high technology in turnkey projects as a problem. In-
stead, the firm's policy is to promote that very transfer by send-
ing hundreds of Japanese technicians to China to train Chinese
258 [Vol. 10:2
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steel workers. The approach taken is to transfer the most modern
steel technology, train the PRC engineers in its use, and get a sub-
stantial fee in return for this "technical service." In a 1977 sale of
a steel mill, such a fee came to $17 million on a $217 million sale. 1
This in effect represents a substantial payment for the industrial
property rights acquired. One can conclude that the best solution
may be to promote the appropriation and transfer of technology,
being sure first to negotiate a good price for it in the contract.
One aim of the present four modernizations campaign is to
speed the economic modernization of the country through the ac-
quisition of foreign technology. If the patent and know-how ques-
tion is approached with this in mind, it should be possible for
"mutually beneficial" technology transfers to take place with a
minimum of friction. A negotiated sale of technology would be pre-
ferable to an attempt to exercise patent rights, even if a patent
system was in place. The foreign supplier of the technology could
receive a profitable fee, while the Chinese could receive the tech-
nology for immediate use in economic development, without hav-
ing to rent the technology for only selected use until the patents
expire. This approach would also remove doubts about later mis-
appropriations by the Chinese partner in joint investments. It also
would go a long way towards convincing the Chinese that one's
firm truly is interested in a mutually beneficial long-term relation-
ship which will aid China's development.
IV. COMMERCIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
A. Chinese Perspective on Commercial Disputes
As in any commercial relationship, disputes are bound to arise
from time to time in the course of foreign investment in China.
What will determine the success or failure of the drive for foreign
investment will not be the number and nature of disputes which
arise, but rather the manner in which they are settled. If disputes
are dealt with in a fair and reasonable manner, then foreign inves-
tors will be attracted to China. However, if commercial disputes
are settled in an arbitrary manner which favors the local partner,
then foreign firms obviously, will not see the climate for invest-
ment as a favorable one.
One must understand that commercial disputes will not be set-
tled judicially. There are at present no courts in existence in
" G. HSIAO. THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA: POLICY, LAW AND PRACTICE 131 (1977).
19801
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
China for litigating commercial disputes, and even if there were, it
is doubtful that the Chinese would agree to a contract clause nam-
ing litigation as an avenue of dispute settlement. The Chinese are
simply not a litigious people, as evidenced by the old Chinese max-
im that "it is better to enter a tiger's mouth than a court of law. 52
Instead of litigation, the Chinese prefer one of four methods of
settlement. In order of preference they are: "friendly negotia-
tions"; consultation (friendly negotiations assisted by the Chinese
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission-FTAC); conciliation
(negotiations with non-binding recommendations given by the
FTAC or some other party); or arbitration. No decisions reached
under these procedures may be reviewed by a court of law, either
foreign or domestic. Note the following typical contract clause on
dispute settlement:
All disputes in connection with this Contract or the execution
thereof shall be settled through friendly negotiations. In case no
settlement can be reached through negotiation, the case may
then be submitted for arbitration to the Foreign Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of Inter-
national Trade. The decision of the Arbitration Commission
shall be final and binding upon both parties; neither party shall
seek recourse to a law court or other authorities to appeal for
revision of the decision.53
Although the Chinese will use the above clause in contracts, very
few cases actually go to a final arbitral award. In fact, some
scholars suggest that arbitration clauses are included in contracts
solely for the purpose of avoiding the jurisdiction of foreign
courts, there being no intent to arbitrate disputes. 4 The Chinese
seem to view litigation in foreign courts as an affront to their
sovereignty. More importantly, however, they embrace a strong
cultural preference for the use of friendly negotiation or discus-
sion, the most common vehicle for reconciling commercial dis-
agreements.
The Chinese are willing to take the time and expense involved
in what have often become long and drawn out negotiations, since
" Theroux, Exporting to China: Practical Legal Problems, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA 124 (H. Holtzman ed. 1976).
" Section 31 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission of the CCPIT also states: "The award given by the Arbitration Commission is
final and neither party shall bring an appeal for revision before a court of law of any other
organization."
' See Henderson & Matsuo, Trade with Japan, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN
TRADE 54 (V. Li ed. 1977).
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such settlement allows the parties to reach an agreement without
either side being declared right or wrong by a third party. They
prefer to settle disputes within the context of building a mutually
beneficial long-term relationship. They seek compromise solutions
reached through friendly negotiation as opposed to settlements
reached through the more adversarial posture found in formal ar-
bitration. In short, the Chinese desire reconciliation reached in
such a manner that the business relationship is allowed to con-
tinue in a cooperative spirit. It is not uncommon to find that dis-
putes which arise in the sale of goods are settled by one party giv-
ing the other a better deal in a later transaction. For example, in a
somewhat typical case, a Chinese food product sold to an Ameri-
can company proved to be defective. The American firm had an in-
surance contract to cover the loss, but a clause in the contract
stated that no insurance could be collected without the American
firm first pressing a claim. The Chinese did not respond to letters
from the American firm which stated a claim for the defects.
Nevertheless, a settlement was reached when the Chinese, with-
out admitting that anything had been wrong with the shipment,
gave a price on the next order which was low enough to compen-
sate the American firm for its loss." Some American companies
also follow this procedure when the Chinese buy American com-
modities and press claims for non-conforming goods; they give lower
prices in subsequent transactions without admitting liability.
This could be seen merely as a means of saving face for both
parties, but in fact the cultural attraction to non-adversary dis-
pute settlements runs deeper. As noted above, the Chinese tend to
settle disputes within the context of building long-term relations.
Thus, the object of dispute settlement is to reach a reconciliation
which will further promote a good business relationship, rather
than by judging the parties. Even when cases are submitted to
the FTAC for formal arbitration, the Chinese arbitrators will
strive for a reconciliation prior to the arbitral proceedings or
before an arbitral award is granted, instead of acting as judges as
do American arbitrators. When a formal arbitration proceeding is
requested, the parties usually first go through the successive stages
of friendly negotiation, consultation and conciliation, rather than
proceeding directly to adjudicatory proceedings.
" Interview with Arthur Downey, partner with the Washington, D.C. office of
Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan, in Washington, D.C. (July 27, 1979).
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B. Methods of Dispute Settlement
In order to judge the effectiveness of the settlement pro-
cedures, it is necessary to examine actual cases of dispute settle-
ments which have utilized them. Although the following examples
are drawn from experiences with the sale of goods or turnkey
projects and not direct investments, they should serve to illus-
trate the legal principles which will be followed by the Chinese.
1. Friendly Negotiations
Friendly negotiations are conducted directly between the par-
ties to a dispute, either by correspondence or in person in China
(usually at the Beijing Office of the FTC involved). The basic dif-
ference between these negotiations and those of a similar sort in
the West is that, in the case of China, one will be dealing with a
government organization located in its own territory. As the fol-
lowing cases show, however, the Chinese do not usually exploit
this advantage in terms of the legal principles involved, although
they will be willing to go on with negotiations without reaching a
settlement longer than most Western firms would like. In any
event, just as in the West, if one has something the other side
wants or needs, he will be in a better negotiating position and able
to reach a settlement more quickly.
This method of negotiation was utilized'in a 1975 United States-
China grain transaction. A dispute arose when the Chinese can-
celled two orders for approximately one million tons of American
wheat and 233,000 bales of cotton." After negotiations, an amic-
able settlement was reached when the Chinese agreed to pay the
difference between the contract price and the much lower market
prices prevailing when the contract was cancelled. This remedy
was the same as that which would have been reached under the
Uniform Commercial Code in the United States. By negotiating
the settlement, the time and expense of litigation was avoided.
Another recent case involved the construction by Nippon Steel
Corporation of a steel works complex at Paoshan. In the spring of
1979, the contract was frozen, the Chinese wishing to change the
settlement terms to deferred payments." Deferred payments
HsIAO, supra note 51, at 155.
5 Journal of Commerce, June 6, 1979, at 1, col. 4. At the same time, over twenty other
deals were frozen by the China National Technical Import Corporation for renegotiation.
The Chinese sought reductions in the scale of industrial plants which had been ordered
(perhaps due to a shortage in the supply of electric power), delays in construction starts,
guarantees that a large portion of the building materials would be obtained locally, and
revised payment terms.
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would reduce Nippon Steers profit on the one billion dollar deal,
so Nippon Steel asked that the price be raised 5.66/o to cover the
additional costs of financing. After negotiations in Peking, Nippon
Steel President Eishiro Saito and Chinese Metallurgical Minister
Tang Ke reached an agreement whereby payments would be de-
ferred for five years at 7.25% interest per annum, and construc-
tion of the steel complex was resumed."
According to a Nippon Steel official, there were actually two
issues involved in the Paoshan payments dispute. 9 The first issue
was whether payment would be in Japanese yen or United States
dollars. As the dollar was depreciating against the yen at the time,
the Chinese wanted payments to be in dollars and the Japanese
preferred yen, neither party wanting to bear the risk of exchange
fluctuations. A settlement was reached when the parties agreed
to half yen, half dollar payments, so that both would equally bear
the exchange risk.
The second issue involved the interest rate which the Chinese
would pay on the deferred payments. Nippon Steel was willing to
give a lower interest rate backed by Japanese governmental assist-
ance in the financing. The Chinese refused the offer, however,
based on their policy of maintaining financial independence from
foreign governments. Nippon Steel then offered to settle by get-
ting the lowest interest rate obtainable from private sources, but
this rate was too high for the Chinese. A settlement was finally
reached when Nippon Steel offered an interest rate which was
slightly lower than that available from private sources. Nippon
Steel took a slight loss here resulting from the gap in the rate
available from private sources and that given to the Chinese, but
it was satisfied with the settlement since it still made a large
profit on the overall deal. Thus, though a claim could have been
pressed for breach of the contract, Nippon Steel was able to reach
an amiable settlement through friendly negotiations which bene-
fited both sides.
2. Consultation
In case a settlement cannot be reached through friendly negoti-
ations, one or both parties may request the assistance of the For-
eign Trade Arbitration Commission." A letter stating the names
Fujimura, China Completes Draft of Foreign Investment Rules, Japan Economic Jour
nal, June 19, 1979 (International Weekly Edition of Nihon Keizai-Shimbun).
5g See note 32 supra.
Holtzmann, Resolving Disputes in US.-China Trade, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA 102-03 (1976).
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and addresses of the parties involved and the nature of the claim
is sufficient action to initiate this process. Once assistance is re-
quested, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Section of the Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs of the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade will begin its own fact finding process. Both
parties will be asked to submit an analysis of their positions (by
correspondence or in person), along with all relevant documents
and other pertinent information. The FTAC may also conduct its
own investigation, getting information from other sources in
China or abroad. All information obtained will be disclosed to both
parties in order to attempt a reconciliation.
After the fact-finding process is completed, the parties will be
helped in analyzing the facts. The strengths and weaknesses of
each position will be pointed out to them, and both will be asked
to reconsider their positions in order to negotiate a friendly settle-
ment. If no agreement is reached, the process will be repeated
again, with the typical case requiring about six months to settle.
The contract will be the basis of any analysis of commercial dis-
putes. Note the following statement from Foreign Trade Practice,
a principal text of the Institute of Foreign Trade in Beijing: "In
foreign claims it is necessary to proceed strictly on the basis of
the contract, accepted business documentation or other effective
proof, because the contract is produced on the basis of the author-
ity and obligations of both sides."6'
Consultation was used to settle a dispute which occurred when
a contract was made by a foreign seller for the shipment of
several cargoes of cocoanuts to China from a South Asian port.62
Because cocoanut shrinks as it dries in transit and weighs less on
delivery than at loading, common trade practice is to consider the
contract as fulfilled if the delivered weight is within 96% of the
weight specified in the contract. The seller noted this in his pre-
liminary correspondence, but nothing was said about the matter
in the contract, which specified the exact delivery weight and
stated "payment shall be on the basis of finally landed quantities."
Upon delivery, the cocoanuts were only 96% of the specified
delivery weight, but the seller demanded full payment on the
basis of his preliminary correspondence. The Foreign Trade Cor-
poration involved said it would pay only 96% of the contract price,
81 FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICE was first published in 1959, and was reprinted in 1972. A par-
tial translation appears in How China Views Claims and Arbitration in Foreign Trade,
U.S.-CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW 24-26 (Sept.-Oct. 1975).
"2 See H. HOLTZMANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 100-01 (1976).
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since there was no shrinkage allowance in the contract itself. The
dispute was referred to the FTAC for assistance in friendly nego-
tiations.
After investigation, the FTAC found that although it was the
established trade practice to allow 4% shrinkage for long voyages
to Europe, this was not the case for the much shorter voyage to
China. It also found that due to market conditions, the seller would
sustain a sizeable loss if forced to deliver 100% weights at the
contract price. Both parties were informed of these findings and of
the fact that the contract was binding over any preceding cor-
respondence. The parties were then able to negotiate a settlement
themselves. The Chinese buyer paid only 96% for the shipments
already made (thus following the principle of strictly honoring the
contract), but at the same time agreed to excuse the seller from
making any further deliveries under the contract terms, prevent-
ing a loss to the seller. The parties were then able to renegotiate
their contract to deal with the shrinkage problem, while continu-
ing their business relationship.
3. Conciliation
If negotiations or consultation fail to achieve a settlement, the
parties may then ask the FTAC to make nonbinding recommenda-
tions. If not satisfied with the recommendations, the parties may
continue their negotiations or proceed to arbitration. Conciliation
is a natural outgrowth of consultation. The FTAC will already be
familiar with the case, from its extensive fact-finding and analysis
in consultation, when conciliation becomes necessary. One expert
reports two cases of settlements reached through conciliation.'
The first involved the purchase of Chinese plush by a foreign
buyer. The buyer claimed the plush was not of the proper texture,
having been flattened by improper packing by the Chinese For-
eign Trade Corporation. After both parties had agreed to concilia-
tion, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
appointed a textiles expert to investigate. He reported that the
plush would regain its proper texture if it were steamed. After
watching a demonstration, the FTAC members involved approved
the solution and recommended it to the buyer. The buyer ac-
cepted and withdrew his claim.
" See Lubman. Trade with the United States, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN
TRADE 235-36 (V. Li ed. 1977).
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The second case reported involved a mistake in a cabled price
quotation. Receiving a request by telegram from a foreign buyer
for a price quotation on a Chinese commodity, the FTC responded
by cable quoting a price to the buyer. The buyer then made a
counter-offer. Meaning to quote a price between the original offer
and the counter-offer, the Chinese seller mistakenly cabled a price
lower than the buyer's counteroffer. The buyer immediately cabled
his acceptance and increased the quantity of his order.
The buyer was notified when the error was discovered. He
asserted a claim, arguing that he already had sold the goods and
would suffer a loss if the quoted price was changed. The solution
proposed by the FTAC (and accepted by the parties) was that the
FTC should bear the responsibility for its error. At the same time,
since the buyer was clearly aware that a mistake had been made
(as evidenced by his increasing the quantity of his order), he
should not be allowed to take advantage of the error. The price
was fixed at that of the buyer's counter-offer, but only for the
original quantity requested. The foreign buyer fared better here
than he would have under American contract law, where the ac-
ceptance probably would have been invalid and hence no contract
made since the buyer should have been aware of the error in the
cabled price quotation.
There has been one dispute settled by obtaining non-binding
recommendations from a body other than the Chinese FTAC. An
American firm, a seller of cotton, pressed a claim for storage
charges when the Chinese buyer delayed in designating a vessel
to pick up the cargo. One American conciliator was appointed by
the American Arbitration Association (Walter Surrey, General
Counsel for the National Council for U.S.-China Trade), and one
Chinese conciliator from the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade. Meeting in Beijing, the conciliators were able
to reach an amicable settlement within ten days, possibly a record
for Chinese dispute settlements. Third-party conciliations such as
this may be used in the future for disputes over transactions
covering the sale of goods. However, if article 14 of the Law on
Joint Ventures is to be taken at face value, then there will be no
nonbinding recommendations given by anything other than Chi-
nese bodies in the case of joint ventures. As the law states, dis-
putes ".... may be settled through conciliation or arbitration by an
arbitral body of China or through arbitration by an arbitral body
agreed upon by the parties." The Chinese text lends itself to
the interpretation that any conciliation or mediation which takes
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place will be conducted solely by a Chinese body and not by any
foreign concern. It is doubtful, then, that non-Chinese conciliators
will become much of a force in dispute settlements involving joint
ventures. Friendly negotiation, consultation, and conciliation with
non-binding recommendations from the Chinese FTAC will prob-
ably continue as the predominate means of resolving disputes.
4. Arbitration
As noted earlier, although most Chinese contracts contain arbi-
tration clauses, very few cases of formal arbitration have actually
taken place. The question for the potential investor, then, is to
what extent formal arbitration can be expected to play a role in
future dispute settlements. Of course, the tremendous cultural in-
centive to use friendly negotiations, consultation and conciliation
will remain. Therefore, the mere inclusion of an arbitration clause
should not be taken to mean that disputes will be arbitrated. In
recent months more and more agreements authorizing arbitration
in third countries have appeared in contracts. However, no cases
of arbitration proceedings in a third country have been reported
(other than the special case of maritime arbitration which, by
tradition, takes place in London).
The real importance of a third country arbitration clause lies in
the bargaining position in which it places the foreign party. One
expert hypothesizes that the Chinese will settle a contract dispute
more quickly if the contract contains a third-country arbitration
clause." This is because of the general Chinese desire to avoid for-
mal arbitration and the particular desire not to be bound by a
decision rendered by a foreign body. If a third-country arbitration
clause is in the contract, the Chinese will be contractually bound
to arbitrate outside of China if negotiations fail to settle the dis-
pute. Thus, they would be under pressure to reach a compromise
and settle more quickly before foreign arbitration becomes the on-
ly remaining method of settling the dispute. Obviously this gives
the foreign company a stronger negotiating stance.
A case in which Chinese-made shirts shrank after being pur-
chased by an American company provides a good example of the
problems surrounding arbitrations. 5 The contract between the
parties contained a standard arbitration clause providing for arbi-
tration in China under the rules of the FTAC. This placed the
Interview (June 20, 1979).
6Id
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American company in a poor bargaining position because it did
not want arbitration by the Chinese officials in Beijing and under
Chinese rules. The American company had no leverage to shorten
the process of negotiation and to reach a more favorable compro-
mise. Had the investor been able to negotiate a third-country arbi-
tration clause in the contract, his bargaining position would have
been enhanced.
The United States-China Trade Agreement and the Law on
Joint Ventures both reinforce the idea that arbitration is to be a
measure of last resort, coming only after negotiations, consulta-
tion and conciliation have failed. Whether arbitration will take
place in China or a third country will continue to be a matter of
negotiation at the outset of the commercial relationship, although
arbitration outside of China is authorized if agreed to by both par-
ties. The Trade Agreement states:
The Contracting Parties encourage the prompt and equitable
settlement of any disputes . . . through friendly consultation,
conciliation or other mutually acceptable means. If such disputes
cannot be settled promptly by any one of the above-mentioned
means, the parties to the dispute may have recourse to arbitra-
tion for settlement in accordance with provisions specified in
their contracts or other agreements to submit to arbitration.
Such arbitration may be conducted by an arbitration institution
in the People's Republic of China, the United States of America,
or a third country."6
In a similar vein, article 14 of the Law on Joint Ventures states
that disputes which cannot be settled by negotiation or consulta-
tion "may be settled through conciliation or arbitration by an arbi-
tral body of China or through arbitration by an arbitral body
agreed upon by the parties." Even with these legal sanctions for
third-country arbitration, the problem will still remain that the
Chinese are reluctant to agree in the contract to non-Chinese arbi-
tration. Actual third-country arbitrations will probably continue
to be extremely rare, although the possibility of seeing them in-
creases as the Chinese sign more and more contracts with third-
country arbitration clauses.
It is likely that cases of arbitration in China will increase more
than third-country arbitration, although even Chinese arbitration
should not be expected to increase sharply, for the cultural
reasons mentioned. If such formal arbitration does occur, the
" Trade Agreement, supra note 48, at art. VIII.
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FTAC can be expected to be reasonable and fair, basing decisions
on the facts of the case in question, as illustrated by the following
settlement.67 The plaintiff in the dispute was a foreign company
with a contract to buy 3,000 tons of agricultural produce from a
Chinese Foreign Trade Corporation. The Chinese FTC was to
deliver in three 1,000 ton installments, with the first bill of lading
to be sent to the buyer between November and December of 1973.
The Chinese company failed to deliver and in January 1974 cabled
a request to the foreign buyer for a time extension. In February of
1974 the foreign buyer claimed damages for breach of the contract
to deliver and requested arbitration. The FTAC began its fact-
finding process, the seller submitted a defense, and an arbitration
Tribunal was appointed. 8 The arbitration began in October 1974
and was completed in November, with the plaintiff attending.
The Tribunal found that although there was a reasonable ex-
cuse for non-delivery, the buyer was justified in refusing to grant
an extension, since the seller did not communicate the reason for
non-delivery until after the time for delivery. The award consisted
of the difference between the contract price for the goods and the
international market price prevailing when delivery was to have
taken place. The seller also had to pay the full costs of the arbitra-
tion. The full award was paid about ten days after its announce-
ment and the plaintiffs fee deposit was returned in full.
The fact that the defendant was a Chinese company did not
seem to prejudice the Chinese arbitrators in this case. The
remedy granted (i.e., the difference between the contract price
and the market price), is the same as would have been reached in
*7 See Liu Yiu-Chu, Arbitration in the PRC: Case Examples Described, CHINA BUSINESS
REVIEW 14 (May-June, 1977).
" Under §§ 4-7 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, each party
selects one arbitrator from the Chinese Arbitration Commission. These two arbitrators in
turn select an umpire from the same Arbitration Commission to form a Tribunal. If both
disputing parties agree, a sole arbitrator may be selected to form a Tribunal. An applica-
tion for arbitration must contain: (a) the names and addresses of the plaintiff and defendant,
(b) the claim of the plaintiff and the facts upon which the claim is based, (c) the name of the
arbitrator chosen or authorization for the Chairman of the Arbitration Commission to ap-
point an arbitrator, (d) the original documents such as the contracts which are relevant to
the application or certified duplicates or copies thereof, and (e) a fee deposit equal to 0.5
percent of the amount of the claim. The application and related documents must be in dupli-
cate for each defendant named. See Decision of the Government Administration Council of
the Central People's Government Concerning the Establishment of a Foreign Trade Arbi-
tration Commission Within the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade,
reprinted in ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN TRADE WITH CHINA, SPECIAL REPORT
No. 4 (1974). See also Torbert China's Joint Venture Lau A Preliminary Analysis, 12
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, at 882 n.214.
1980)
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
a judicial proceeding in the United States under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Of course, since arbitration is conducted solely by
Chinese there is perhaps the potential for prejudice against the
foreign party to a dispute. Certainly this will be a question in the
minds of foreign investors contemplating a move into China. The
record, however, should assuage such apprehensions.
In summary, it seems that in order to reach satisfactory solu-
tions to contract disputes, the foreign investor in China must
follow the old adage, "When in Rome, do as the Romans." This will
mean learning to handle problems within the context of the over-
all business relationship, and learning to rely on friendly negotia-
tions, consultation and conciliation as the primary modes of reach-
ing settlements. This should be beneficial to the investor in the
long run in terms of developing a good working realtionship with
the Chinese partner and building an enterprise which is mutually
beneficial to both partners. Attempts to force the Chinese into
American-style adjudicatory proceedings should be avoided, if for
no other reason than that it would be culturally offensive.
V. CONCLUSION
While the legal framework discussed above could best be de-
scribed as emerging and incomplete, its very existence makes
China an interesting prospect for the foreign investor. Although
the Chinese have gotten along well for centuries without this form
of law, they are aware that many potential foreign investors re-
quire legal assurances that their investments will be protected.
As Professor Li has pointed out, law and lawyers in China are a
relatively recent phenomenon.69 To the extent that it has devel-
oped in China, commercial law exists as a means of facilitating the
current modernization drive and attracting foreign investment
and technology. At this early stage, investors should not be overly
concerned with the details of the laws, but should be encouraged
by the willingness of the Chinese to enact legislation designed to
promote foreign investment.
Kevin K. Maher
' See Li, Reflections on the Current Drive Toward Greater Legalization in China, 10
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 220 (1980).
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